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1. Introduction 
State-owned gas company Gazprom1 controls most of the Russian gas production and has the sole 
right to export gas to Europe. Since 1997, a structural reform that would bring competition into the 
Russian gas industry has been intensely debated, and a split-up of Gazprom into several smaller gas-
producing companies was one of the proposed options of the reform (Locatelli, 2003). The debate 
ended in 2003, when Russian President Vladimir Putin publicly stated that he would not break up 
Gazprom (Stern, 2005). Since then, Gazprom seems to have enjoyed a strong position in both the 
European and Russian gas markets. 
 
Until recently, Russian gas pricing policy has, to some extent, justified Gazprom’s dominance in the 
Russian gas industry. Other Russian gas producers, or independent producers as they are known in 
Russia, are formally free to sell their gas at market prices. However, Gazprom has historically sold its 
gas at low regulated prices in Russia, aimed at stimulating Russia’s economic growth after the collapse 
of the planned economy. In recent years, as the Russian economy began to recover, the Russian 
government gradually started to increase Gazprom’s gas prices (Spanjer, 2007). Deregulation of 
Russian gas prices might be the next step in Russian gas price reform. In 2006 Russian opened a gas 
exchange, where up to 10 bcm was sold at unregulated prices. There are further plans to extend gas 
volumes sold at unregulated price. Price deregulation might stimulate Gazprom to abuse its market 
power and cause a significant rise in domestic gas prices. Therefore, the question arises as to whether 
Gazprom’s dominance in the Russian gas industry can still be defended when Russian gas prices are 
deregulated. 
 
Natural gas has great importance for Russia’s wealth. It generates high export profits, provides an 
inexpensive energy supply to the country and remains an important instrument of Russian foreign 
policy. This makes the Russian government particularly cautious in making changes in the gas 
industry that have a potential danger of reducing the economic gains from natural gas. Importantly, in 
managing relations with its gas trading partners, the Russian government focuses primarily on its own 
gains. 
 
In this paper, I examine the conditions under which the split-up of Gazprom is economically efficient 
for Russia. Assuming that Russian national welfare is a main concern of the Russian government, this 
paper carries out theoretical and numerical analysis to study whether the split-up of Gazprom is 
beneficial for Russia when the Russian domestic market is deregulated. In its concern for national 
                                                     
1 In 2005, the Russian government increased its stake in Gazprom from 38% to 51%. 
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welfare, it is assumed that the government ignores the effect of the breakup on foreign firms and 
consumers, and cares only about the domestic consumer surplus and the profit earned by national 
firms in domestic and export markets. In the industrial organization literature, national welfare is often 
used when changes in an industry, which is involved in international trade, are analyzed (e.g., Barros 
and Cabral (1994), Zhang and Chen (2002), Clougherty (2002)). 
 
I consider a hypothetical long-run equilibrium for the base year of 2005 and compare the reference 
case, which describes the situation where Gazprom is not split up, with the case where Gazprom is 
split up and new gas-producing companies compete independently with each other in two markets for 
Russian gas: the domestic gas market and the European gas market. I assume Cournot competition in 
both the domestic and European gas markets before and after the restructuring of Gazprom. Before 
and after the restructuring, Gazprom’s competitors in the domestic market are Russian independent 
gas producers, and in the European market, they are importers from other gas-producing countries. 
 
Gazprom today is the only Russian company that can export gas to Europe. Splitting up Gazprom into 
several smaller competitors will affect the export structure of the Russian gas market. In the debate on 
Gazprom’s restructuring, two main variants of the future structure of gas exports were considered. The 
first is the centralized sale of Russian gas to Europe through one channel. The second is competition 
among several Russian exporters. I concentrate my analysis on the second variant; that is, I look at the 
restructuring reform that allows companies detached from Gazprom to compete with each other on the 
European gas market. Given the ongoing liberalization of the European gas market, focus on the 
reform that opens competition on the Russian export side is especially important for assessment of the 
conditions under which Gazprom’s split-up is attractive for both Russia and the EU. However, it 
should be stressed that I assume that after the split-up, only companies detached from Gazprom can 
export, while independent gas producers still cannot export and sell to the domestic consumers only. 
While Tsygankova (2007) analyzes how Russian national welfare is affected if independent producers 
are allowed to compete with Gazprom on the European market, this study concentrates on the split-up 
of Gazprom. 
 
There are a number of studies that explore the quantitative relation between the Cournot-equilibrium 
price, the number of producing firms in the market, the profit of the producers, and national welfare. 
For example, Andersson and Bergman (1995) analyze numerically how a split-up of Swedish 
electricity-producing company Vattenfall into two separate and independently managed firms will 
change Swedish national welfare. The numerical model of Golombek et al. (1998) illustrates that a 
split-up of a single Norwegian gas exporter to the European market into two independent exporters 
might benefit Norway. 
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In the theoretical literature, there are a number of articles that look at a Cournot oligopoly where all 
firms can simultaneously create independent divisions (see Baye et al. (1996), Gonzalez-Maestre 
(2000), Corchon and Gonzalez-Maestre (2000)). However, the theoretical literature that analyzes the 
oligopolistic market where only one firm splits up into independent divisions, with the exception of 
Polasky (1992), is rare. On the other side, the split-up of a company can be considered as the opposite 
of a merger of several independent companies. The impact of horizontal mergers on profit and welfare 
is thoroughly studied in the literature. The literature on horizontal mergers provides a theoretical base 
for the results of this paper. 
 
Theoretical analysis of horizontal mergers consistently suggests that in the Cournot market, the 
aggregate market share of the firms involved in the merger is the main determinant of merger 
profitability (see Salant et al. (1983), Levin (1990), Cheung (1992), Fauli-Oller (1997), Hennessy 
(2000)). Applying these findings to split-ups, the profit that a company involved in a split-up earns is 
more likely to increase after the split-up the higher is the market share of the other companies in the 
market not involved in the split-up. The intuition here is that the companies not involved in the split-
up respond to the split-up by reducing their supply and therefore prevent the market price from falling 
significantly. Therefore, the market share of non-Russian gas suppliers to Europe might be an 
important determinant for the decision about Gazprom’s restructuring. 
 
Farrell and Shapiro (1990) analyze horizontal mergers in Cournot oligopoly and provide a sufficient 
condition for profitable mergers to increase welfare in a closed economy. For the case of split-ups, 
Farrell and Shapiro’s result would require that in order for the split-up to be welfare enhancing, the 
market share of nonsplitting rivals has to be relatively small. Supply of non-Gazprom production to 
the domestic Russian market is small. Therefore, if the export profits that Russia earns on the 
European gas market are small, it can be expected that restructuring of Gazprom will increase Russian 
national welfare. 
 
As split-ups are given far less attention in the theoretical literature than horizontal mergers, I find it to 
be a useful exercise to set up a theoretical model that focuses on the split-up of a company that is an 
oligopolistic producer in both the domestic and export markets. In the theoretical literature on mergers 
and divisionalization, companies in a market are often assumed to have the same marginal costs. This 
is a strong simplification, especially for the gas market. Costs of different gas producers normally 
differ because they supply gas from gas fields that vary in size, depth of gas deposits and 
transportation distance to consumers. Then, in my theoretical analyses, I weaken this assumption, 
allowing differences in costs between splitting and nonsplitting companies. 
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 develops a theoretical model that is used to examine how 
profit and welfare are affected if a firm in an oligopolistic industry is split up. Section 3 presents some 
central data required for the numerical calibration. Section 4 explores the impact of splitting up 
Gazprom. Section 5 numerically examines the dependence between Gazprom’s markets shares and 
changes in Russian national welfare because of the restructuring reform. Section 6 examines the 
sensitivity of the numerical result to demand elasticity parameters. Finally, Section 7 concludes the 
discussion. 
2. Theoretical Model 
The focus of the theoretical analysis below is the effect of split-ups on the national welfare of an 
economy, where the firm involved in the split-up competes Cournot-style in both the domestic and 
export markets. The national welfare of such an economy consists of two components: domestic and 
foreign. The domestic component is the change in domestic welfare, which is the sum of consumer 
surplus and profits earned on the domestic market. The foreign component is the change in the 
national profits earned on the foreign market. 
 
It is mathematically cumbersome to analyze theoretically the effect of a split-up on national welfare 
for general demand and cost functions. Therefore, for simplicity, in the theoretical model, I assume 
linear demand and constant marginal costs. The effects that a split-up has on the domestic component 
and on the foreign component are independent when the splitting firm has constant marginal costs. I 
analyze separately the split-up’s effect on profit and welfare in a closed economy. At the end of this 
section, I examine the effects of split-ups on welfare and profit together, and analyze conditions under 
which the split-up of a firm that both sells domestically and exports can enhance national welfare. 
2.1 Basic model 
Consider a Cournot industry where all firms sell their homogeneous output at the market price, P. The 
inverse demand function is P(Y) ≡ a – bY, where Y is total industry output. In a set of n+1 firms, one 
firm is reformed. After the reform, production of this firm is split up, and m new independent firms are 
created. There are n+m firms after the reform.For convenience, I will refer to the subset of firms 
involved in the split-up as splitters and to the subset of firms not involved in the split-up as 
nonsplitters.  
 
Let Y S denote the splitters’ aggregate production. Before the reform, Y S is the supply of the splitting 
firm, and after the reform, it is the sum of supplies of the m firms established after the split-up. Y NS 
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denotes the nonsplitters’ aggregate output, which is the sum of supplies from the n firms that are not 
involved in the split-up. 
 
The cost advantages often give incentives for smaller firms to operate under a larger company. On the 
other hand, larger companies are typically complex organizations, and additional resources are 
required to coordinate their production. The larger companies often have fewer incentives to minimize 
their costs. In this analysis, however, I disregard any cost effects because of the split-up. For 
simplicity, I assume that all firms have constant marginal costs. Let C S be the marginal cost of the 
splitting firm. I assume that the marginal cost of each new firm established after the split-up remains 
CS. Let all nonsplitters have the same marginal cost C NS.  
 
In Cournot equilibrium, prereform aggregate supplies of splitters and nonsplitters are characterized by 
the following conditions: 
(1) ( )1 1 1 0S S NS SbY a b Y Y C− + − + − = ,  
(2) ( )1 1 1 0NS S NS NSYb a b Y Y Cn− + − + − = . 
The subscript “1” in (1) and (2) denotes the equilibrium outputs that firms choose before the reform. 
Equation (1) is the first-order condition for the splitting firm. Equation (2) is the sum of the first-order 
conditions for all nonsplitters divided by the number of nonsplitters n, where the first-order condition 
of nonsplitter j is: 
(3) ( ) 0S NS NSjby a b Y Y C− + − + − = , 
where j
nj
NS yY Σ== ...1 . 
 
The conditions for aggregate supply from splitters and nonsplitters after the restructuring reform are: 
(4) ( )2 2 2 0S S NS SYb a b Y Y Cm− + − + − = ,  
(5) ( )2 2 2 0NS S NS NSYb a b Y Y Cn− + − + − = . 
The subscript “2” in (4) and (5) denotes the equilibrium outputs that firms choose after the reform. 
Equation (4) is the sum of the first-order conditions for each new firm established after the split-up 
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and divided by the number of these firms m. Equation (5) is the sum of the first-order conditions for all 
nonsplitters divided by the number of nonsplitters n. 
 
In the Cournot market, the splitters’ aggregate production as well as the total industry production will 
expand after the restructuring reform. This and other important comparative-statics properties, which 
are useful for this analysis, are formulated in Proposition 1 (proved in Appendix ). 
Proposition 1 
If in a Cournot market a larger firm splits up into m smaller independent firms, then: 
(i) aggregate output of the splitters will increase, i.e., Y2 S ≥ Y1 S; 
(ii) aggregate output of the nonsplitters will decrease, but by less, i.e., Y1 NS ≥ Y2 NS and Y2 ≥ Y1; 
(iii) splitters’ prereform output decreases and nonsplitters’ prereform output increases as the 
number of nonsplitters n increases, i.e., 01 <∂
∂
n
Y S
and 01 >∂
∂
n
Y NS
; 
(iv) splitters’ post reform output increases as the number of new independent firms m increases, 
i.e., 02 >∂
∂
m
Y S
. 
Proposition 1 (i) and (ii) simply specify the changes in equilibrium outputs after the split-up in a 
Cournot setting. The increase in equilibrium output of splitters implies a decrease in the equilibrium 
output of nonsplitters and, therefore, a respective change in market shares of splitters and nonsplitters. 
Therefore, Proposition 1 (iii) indicates how allocation of markets shares in a Cournot market is tied to 
the numbers of nonsplitters. The larger the number of nonsplitters in the market, the smaller is the 
market share of the splitters. Finally, Proposition 1 (iv) indicates that the larger the number of new 
companies established after the split-up reform, the more affected is the initial equilibrium. 
2.2 Effect of split-up on profit 
The following proposition (see proof in Appendix) establishes conditions under which a split-up can 
increase or decrease splitters’ profit. 
Proposition 2 
Assume a Cournot oligopoly with n+1 firms, with a linear demand function, and firms have constant 
marginal costs. One firm is considering splitting into m independent firms. S1S is the prereform market 
share of the firm. Then: 
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(i) if mn >+1  and 
11 +−< mm
mS S , then the split-up will increase the splitters’ profits; 
(ii) if mn >+1 and 
11 +−≥ mm
mS S , then the split-up will decrease the splitters’ profits; 
(iii) if mn ≤+1 , then the split-up will not increase the splitters’ profits. 
Proposition 2 shows that the prereform market share of the splitting firm is an important indication of 
whether the split-up is profit enhancing or not. Given that mn >+1 , if the market share of the 
splitting firm is relatively low, then the split-up is profitable; conversely, for a large market share, the 
split-up will generate losses. On the other hand, Proposition 2 (iii) says that given mn ≤+1 , a split-
up is unprofitable irrespective of the market share of the splitting firm. However, according to 
Proposition 1 (iii), the number of nonsplitters n affects the market share of the splitters. The smaller is 
n, the larger is the splitters’ market share. Indeed, mn ≤+1  requires quite a small number of 
nonsplitters or a very large number of firms established after the split-up. For example, when the 
splitting firm is divided into m = 4 firms, n has to be zero in order for the inequality above to hold. If 
the splitting firm is a monopolist and  n = 0, the market share of the splitters S1S is equal to one, and 
the splitters’ profits are always lower after the split-up. 
 
Proposition 2 shows that m is also an important indicator of the profitability of the split-up. As m 
increases, 
1+− mm
m
 decreases. Therefore, the larger is the number of newly established firms m, 
the smaller the market share SS1  of the splitting firm must be in order for the split-up to be profit 
enhancing. Therefore, downsizing of a split-up reform, which is unprofitable for splitters, might 
become profitable. 
 
The discussion above suggests that a high prereform market share of splitters will generate profit 
losses for splitters from the split-up, while a low prereform market share of splitters will generate 
profit gains. This result occurs because of the equilibrium response of firms outside of the split up. 
Indeed, as is well known, the profit earned by a monopolist is always higher than the joint profit of 
several companies competing in this market because of the split-up of a monopoly. However, the 
situation can change if the company that is split up is not a single supplier in the market. That is, there 
are both splitters and nonsplitters. If nonsplitters do not change their supply after the split-up, then 
clearly the profit of the splitters will decrease. However, in the equilibrium, in response to an increase 
in supply from the splitter, the nonsplitters should reduce their production. The market price will be 
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higher than in the situation where nonsplitters do not respond. Therefore, the profit of the splitters will 
be at least as high as in the situation where the nonsplitters do not respond. In the equilibrium, the 
large market share of the nonsplitters results in a large reduction in supply from nonsplitters when the 
splitters are split up. Thus, when the market share of splitters is low, the split-up will have a positive 
effect on the profit of the splitters. 
2.3 Effect of the split-up on welfare 
The following proposition (see proof in Appendix) establishes the sufficient conditions for the split-up 
to be welfare increasing and welfare decreasing. 
Proposition 3 
Assume a Cournot oligopoly with n+1 firms, with a linear demand function, and firms have constant 
marginal costs. One firm is considering splitting up into m independent firms. SS1 is the prereform 
market share of the firm. 
(i) If 
1
1
1 +> nS
S , then the split-up increases welfare. The larger is m, the greater is the increase in 
welfare. 
(ii) If 
2
1
1 +< nS
S , then the split-up decreases welfare. The larger is m, the greater is the decrease 
in welfare. 
As is well known, increased competition will increase welfare. However, this is not always true when 
the market share of the splitting firm is small. Proposition 3 says that the splitting company has to be 
more efficient than nonsplitters for the split-up to increase welfare. When the splitting company is 
quite inefficient, this is reflected in its very low market share. Then the split-up of a low-efficiency 
company results in some efficient production being substituted by inefficient production. Such 
reallocation of output can adversely affect welfare. 
2.4 Effect of split-up on national welfare 
In Sections 2.2 and 2.3, I assumed a closed economy and analyzed the effect of a split-up on profit and 
welfare. Now consider an economy where splitters can export to a foreign market. Otherwise, the 
economy is closed to import from abroad, and nonsplitters cannot export. Then, the national welfare, 
W N, consists of domestic welfare, W D, plus splitters’ export profit, ortS expπ .The changes in national 
welfare because of the split-up can then be written as: 
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 Δ W N = Δ W D + Δ ortS expπ . 
Two effects determine the sign of the split-up effect on national welfare: the effect on domestic 
welfare and the effect on export profit. The split-up will not enhance national welfare when at least 
one of the effects is negative and outweighs another. If the split-up increases domestic welfare but at 
the same time has a strong negative effect on export profits, then the split-up might not be beneficial 
for the national economy. 
 
The prereform market shares of the splitting firm in each market can be important information for 
predicting whether the proposed restructuring will be positive for the economy. Proposition 2 suggests 
that for a low prereform share of the splitting company in the foreign market, the split-up will have a 
positive effect on the export profit earned by the economy. On the other hand, according to 
Proposition 3, the small market share of the splitter in the domestic market can have a negative effect 
on domestic welfare. 
 
Table 1: Impact of market share size on national welfare 
 Domestic market 
 
Effect on Δ W D 
Foreign market 
 
 Effect on Δ ortS expπ  
Small market share – + 
Large market share + – 
 
Table 1 illustrates how the combination of market shares that the splitting company has in two markets 
might contribute to changes in national welfare after the split-up. In the table, a negative sign indicates 
a negative effect, and a positive sign indicates a positive effect on the respective component of 
national welfare. As Table 1 shows, a large domestic market share and a small foreign market share is 
the only combination of market shares that will generate with certainty an increase in national welfare 
after the split-up. Conversely, if the splitting firm dominates in the foreign market and does not control 
much of the domestic market, then a split-up will not produce any gains for the economy. The effect 
on national welfare in the cases where the splitting firm dominates both the domestic and foreign 
markets, or has small shares in both markets, is unclear. In these cases, a trade-off between domestic 
welfare and export profit will determine whether the split-up is welfare enhancing. 
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3. Numerical Model 
The theoretical model above formally discusses conditions under which a split-up of a company that is 
a big supplier on both the domestic and export markets might increase national welfare. Although the 
model provides key insights for the basic mechanisms, the results are for general to suggest anything 
about the welfare effects on an actual split up. This motivates the numerical model presented in this 
section. In the numerical model, Gazprom allocates its production between two markets: the domestic 
Russian gas market and the European gas market. The model assumes an oligopolistic market 
structure in both Russia and Europe, and the equilibrium concept is Cournot in both markets. The 
starting point of the numerical model is a reference case, which describes the situation where 
Gazprom is not restructured. The reference case and the calibrations are based on assumptions similar 
to those in Tsygankova (2007) and are explained in more detail in the subsections below. 
3.1 Two gas markets 
Generally speaking, Russian natural gas is consumed in two markets: the domestic Russian gas market 
and the European gas market. In 2005, Russia supplied natural gas to practically all countries in 
Europe that were net importers of natural gas, including not only current EU countries but also 
countries in the Commonwealth Independent States (CIS). While Gazprom sells its gas at market 
prices to Western European countries, prices for Russian gas in the CIS and some Eastern European 
countries are still set lower by bilateral agreements. However, EU enlargement and the Russian–
Ukrainian conflict on gas prices that raged in January 2006 indicate a movement towards market 
pricing throughout all of Europe in the long run. Therefore, the focus of the model is restricted to 
consumption in two regions: Europe and Russia.  
3.2 Demand 
For the calibration of natural gas demand in Europe and Russia, I use 2005 data for gas prices and 
consumption levels (see BP (2006)). There is, in general, little consensus in the literature about the 
price and income elasticities in energy markets, and estimates of elasticities for Russia are almost 
nonexistent. In the survey by Al-Sahlawi (1989) on price and income elasticities of natural gas 
demand, long-run price elasticities range from –0.56 to –4.6. Because of the lack of definitive 
evidence, I have chosen a value for the price elasticity of natural gas demand in Europe of –0.7. This is 
in line with other studies that model the European gas market (e.g., Golombek et al., 1995). 
 
The only known estimates of elasticities for Russia are found in the econometric study by Solodnikova 
(2003). She finds no significant link between natural gas consumption in Russia and the price of gas. 
The result can be partly explained by low natural gas tariffs relative to other energy sources. As 
natural gas remains the cheapest energy source in Russia, a price change may not have a notable effect 
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on consumer behavior. In addition, the Russian energy infrastructure was built during the Soviet 
planned-economy era and allowed few substitution possibilities between energy alternatives; 
therefore, consumers still often have to rely on one energy source. Nevertheless, some studies use a 
price elasticity of around –0.5 for natural gas demand in Russia (see, e.g., Holtsmark and Mæstad 
(2002) and Tarr and Thomson (2004)). Assuming that future domestic market reforms will bring on 
more substitution with other energy sources, so that consumer response to gas price variations will be 
larger than zero, I choose a price demand elasticity in Russia of –0.4, which lies between the results of 
Solodnikova and the latter studies. 
3.3 Gas producers 
In 2005, besides Gazprom, the supply of natural gas to Europe consisted partly of imports from five 
companies in other major gas-producing countries (two Norwegian companies, Statoil and Norsk 
Hydro2; the Dutch Gasunie; the Algerian Sonatrach; and the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Corporation) and partly of indigenous European gas production. In the model, Gazprom and the five 
foreign companies choose their quantities to supply to Europe under Cournot competition. Indigenous 
European gas production, which was 172 bcm in 2005 (BP, 2006), is assumed to be exogenous to the 
model. The exogeneity assumption is a simplification but can be justified on the grounds that in order 
to mitigate their strong dependence on importing natural gas, most European countries with their own 
gas production capabilities produce at their production capacities regardless of the gas price. 
 
In the Russian domestic market, Gazprom competes with Russian independent producers. By the end 
of 2005, after several acquisitions and mergers in the Russian petroleum sector, four oil companies 
(Surgutneftegaz, Rosneft, TNK-BP and Lukoil) and two small gas companies (Novatek and Itera) 
were responsible for practically all non-Gazprom gas production in Russia. In the empirical model, 
these six independent gas producers, Gazprom and a single supplier from Turkmenistan independently 
compete with each other à la Cournot. Gazprom currently buys Turkmen gas under long-term 
contracts and resells it to Russian and CIS consumers. However, if the Russian gas market is 
deregulated, as is assumed in the model, imported gas from Turkmenistan has to be sold directly to the 
market in order to add to competition. 
3.4 Production and transportation costs 
The estimates of costs for Russian and non-Russian gas producers are mainly based on the data by 
OME (2001), which provide estimates of average production costs and transportation costs of natural 
gas to Europe by major gas-producing area for the period 2010–2020. Natural gas delivery to a 
                                                     
2 In October 2007 Statoil and NorskHydro merged and the new company StatoilHydro was established. 
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consumption market depends on the extraction conditions in particular producing areas as well as on 
the remoteness of production from the market. In addition, the production capacities of the fields 
under operation are limited. Combining information on the production capacity of the gas fields under 
operation in the base year 2005 and OME estimates of production costs, I use the piecewise 
production cost function for each gas producer in the model.  
 
For estimates of Russian gas transportation costs I use OME’s data that report unit transportation costs 
from production regions in Russia to the Russian border with Ukraine. The transportation costs depend 
on the length of the transportation route. As Russian consumers are located closer to production 
regions than European consumers, the gas transportation costs to Russian consumers are adjusted by 
the average distance to the domestic market. Therefore, transportation costs differ between regions of 
production (Nadym Pur Taz, Orenburg, Astrahan and Yamal) and between domestic and export 
markets. The transportation costs to Europe are also increased by a transit tariff that Russia has to pay 
in order to pipe gas through Ukraine. The total transportation costs is estimated at US$17,84 per 
1000m3.3 
4. Breaking up Gazprom’s Monopoly 
If restructuring reform in the Russian gas industry occurs and Gazprom’s production and exports are 
split up into several companies, the market outcomes will change. In order to answer the question of 
whether the breaking up of Gazprom will benefit Russia , I now focus on a Nash–Cournot equilibrium 
where Gazprom’s regional producing subsidiaries noncooperatively compete with each other in both 
the domestic and export markets. 
 
Currently Gazprom’s gas production is mainly concentrated in the monopolist’s six subsidiaries: 
Astrakhangazprom, Nadymgazprom, Orenburggazprom, Noyabrskgazodobycha, Urengoygazprom, 
Yamburggazodobycha (Stern, 2005). The division into producing subsidiaries, which have been built 
around the giant gas fields discovered in the 1960s–70s, is mainly regionally based. The idea of 
creating competition in the Russian gas industry was high on the agenda during 1997–2003. 
Reorganizing Gazprom’s production subsidiaries into independent producing companies was the 
natural way to break up the monopoly (MEDT, 2003). If the production separation of Gazprom ever 
takes place, it remains to be seen how Gazprom’s assets will be allocated. To assess the long-run 
effects of Gazprom’s production unbundling from the current production structure, we first consider 
                                                     
3 In January 2006, the tariff for transit of Russian gas through Ukraine became US$1,6 per 1000m3 per 100 km. The distance 
from the Russian–Ukrainian border to Uzhgorod, a town in Ukraine located in the west near the border with Slovakia, is 1115 
km (OME, 2001). Therefore the total transportation costs through Ukraine can be estimated at US$17,84 per1000 m3. 
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splitting into these six subsidiaries. In Section 5, alternative ways of dividing Gazprom are also 
discussed. 
 
Table 2. Breaking up the natural gas export monopoly in Russia 
 Reference case Gazprom is split up 
by subsidiaries 
Price in Europe for natural gas ($/1000 m3) 193 149 
 Total supply to European market (bcm) 650 824 
which is divided  between:   
 Gazprom   221    (34%)* 404     (49%) 
 non-Russian producers   429    (66%) 420     (51%) 
Price in Russia for natural gas ($/1000 m3) 133 80 
Total supply to Russian market (bcm) 243 297 
which is divided  between:   
by Gazprom (percent)  63      (26%) 148.5   (50%) 
by Independent gas producer (percent)  180    (74%) 148.5   (50%) 
Note:* In parenthesis markets shares are reported. 
 
Table 2 shows that after the restructuring reform occurs, Russian gas supply is increased in both the 
domestic and export markets. Increased competition will force independent producers to reduce their 
production. On the other hand, the joint supply to the domestic market from Gazprom’s former 
companies more than doubles in the model. Similar changes occur in the European gas market. As 
supply from non-Russian producers is reduced, the overall supply to Europe increases because of an 
almost doubling of supply from Gazprom’s companies. 
 
The reference case and the split-up case model the situation when gas prices in Russia are 
unregulated. The results in Table 2 point out that Gazprom’s presence in the Russian gas market can 
be significantly reduced if Russian gas prices are deregulated. Indeed, in the reference case, 
Gazprom’s domestic market share is 26%, while Gazprom’s observed market share in 2005 was about 
76% (Gazprom, 2006). This is because in the deregulated market, domestic prices are considerably 
higher than prices in 2005, which are regulated. Therefore, independent producers get additional 
incentives to develop their gas resources. In addition, in the deregulated market, Gazprom is no longer 
forced to deliver large volumes of gas at low prices. Gazprom can then behave as a profit maximizer 
and will considerably reduce its domestic supply compared with the actual situation in 2005. On the 
other hand, the results in Table 2 show that gas price deregulation in Russian will not significantly 
affect Gazprom’s position in Europe. In Europe, Gazprom’s market share in the reference case and 
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that actually observed in 2005 are practically the same: 34% versus 35% (the latter is calculated from 
BP (2006) and Gazprom (2006)). 
Table 3 summarizes how Russian producers’ profit, Russian consumers’ surplus and Russian national 
welfare are affected by the restructuring reform. 
 
Table 3.  Division of Gazprom: Changes in Russian producers’ profit, Russian consumers’ 
surplus and Russian national welfare 
 Gazprom’s 
export profit 
Gazprom’s 
domestic profit
Independents’ 
profit 
Consumer 
surplus 
National 
welfare 
Change in $b –2.73 –2.51 –9.84 13.92 –1.17 
 
The restructuring of Gazprom and increased competition in the domestic market will decrease the 
domestic price from $133/1000 m3 to $80/1000 m3, and as a result, consumer surplus will increase by 
$13.92 billion. However, the increase in consumer surplus will not cover the losses in profit for 
Russian producers. The reduction in the profit of independent producers is obvious. As the supply 
from Gazprom’s subsidiaries increases, the independent producers’ response is withdrawal of some of 
their production from the domestic market. Thus, in the new equilibrium, independent producers sell a 
lower volume of gas at a lower price, and their profit is reduced. The effect of Gazprom’s restructuring 
on the overall profit of Gazprom is also negative in both markets. 
 
It should be noted that besides the price effect, there is also a cost effect that contributes to Gazprom’s 
reduced profit because of the split-up. Before the split-up, Gazprom can rationalize gas production 
between its subsidiaries and therefore minimize costs. After the split-up, each subsidiary produces 
independently and cannot rationalize production. The calculation of the model shows that Gazprom’s 
average cost of production per 1000 m3 of natural gas increases from $43 to $46 because of the split-
up. 
 
National welfare is defined as the surplus of Russian consumers plus the surplus of Russian producers. 
According to Table 3, Gazprom’s split-up decreases Russian national welfare as the losses in 
producers’ surplus outweigh the gains in consumers’ surplus. Thus, numerical results indicate that 
given the national welfare criteria the split-up of Gazprom is unattractive.  
 
It is important to note that the conclusion about the unattractiveness of Gazprom’s restructuring is 
based on the assumption that the government weights the surplus of all market participants equally 
when it measures national welfare. However, if the government decision is affected by the number of 
lobbying groups, then the government will put more weight on the surplus of market participants who 
represent groups with stronger lobbying power. Recent years witnessed the significant influence of 
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Gazprom on the decision making of the Russian government. According to Table 3, Gazprom’s profit 
is reduced in both domestic and export markets when the company is split up. Given the strong 
political influence of Gazprom, the numerical results reflect the fact that the government might refrain 
from splitting up Gazprom despite the high consumer gains that the restructuring reform can bring. 
Nevertheless, political influence is probably not a satisfactory argument if one wants to evaluate 
whether Gazprom’s position in the Russia gas industry can be economically justified. Then the 
assessment criterion that simply sums up the gains and losses that the reform entails seems to be fair. 
5. Other Scenarios 
Table 3 shows that under market structure in Europe and Russia in 2005, Gazprom’s restructuring 
reform decreases Russian national welfare. As discussions in Section 2 point out, the market shares 
that Gazprom controls in both the Russian and European gas markets are important indicators of the 
expediency of the restructuring reform. In this section, I illustrate numerically how Gazprom’s 
restructuring reform affects Russian national welfare given changes in Gazprom’s market shares. 
5.1 Gazprom’s market share in Europe 
Gazprom’s market share in Europe is determined by supplies to Europe from both Gazprom and non-
Russian producers. Figure 2 below shows how Gazprom’s market share in the European gas market 
affects the change in national welfare, Russian export profit and domestic welfare because of 
Gazprom’s restructuring reform. Several runs of the numerical model, where production capacities for 
non-Russian gas exporters are changed in each run, simulate alteration in Gazprom’s market share in 
Europe. In order to distinguish the export market share’s impact on Russian national welfare, here I 
concentrate on the scenarios where only non-Russian production capacity varies, not Gazprom’s. 
 
Thus, Figure 2 imitates continuity of the scenarios for different production capacities of  Gazprom’s 
rivals on the European gas market. In Figure 2, scenarios where Gazprom has a lower market share in 
Europe reflect higher production capacities of non-Russian producers. According to Figure 2, 
Gazprom needs to control at least 33% of the European gas market to ensure that its split-up is not 
supported under the national welfare criteria. In the reference case, Gazprom’s market share in Europe 
is 34%. The increase of non-Russian gas in the European market is necessary in order for Gazprom’s 
restructuring reform to increase Russian national welfare. 
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Figure1: Welfare effects from Gazprom's split up  for different Gazprom's 
market shares
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National welfare is the sum of domestic welfare and export profit. As Figure 2 shows, domestic gains 
from Gazprom’s split-up are positive, but they diminish as Gazprom’s position in Europe strengthens. 
This is because a higher market share in Europe means larger exports for Gazprom and therefore less 
supply to the domestic market. Gazprom’s market power in the domestic market is then reduced, and 
the positive domestic gains from restructuring are mitigated. 
 
Changes in export profits because of restructuring reform are positive when Gazprom has small 
market shares in Europe, and they are negative when Gazprom’s market share is large. When 
Gazprom has almost no market power in Europe, increases in Russian exports because of reform have 
little impact on price in Europe. Therefore, an increase in exports drives Russian export profits up. In 
Figure 2, if Gazprom controls no more than 15% of the European market, reform generates even larger 
export profits as Gazprom’s market share increases. This is because the larger is the market share of 
Gazprom, the stronger is Gazprom’s export growth because of reform, and at the same time, the price 
response to Gazprom’s restructuring is low when Gazprom’s market share in Europe is low. When 
Gazprom controls more than 15%, export gains from the reform start to fall. This is because the price 
response to greater Russian exports gets stronger. 
 
Given the allocation of gas assets in Russia in the base year 2005, Figure 1 depicts the dependence of 
Russian national welfare on the European gas supply of Gazprom’s rivals. However, doubtless 
conditions in the Russian gas industry will differ from the base year when, if ever, serious evaluation 
of the Gazprom restructuring takes place. As the theoretical results point out, it is the combination of 
Gazprom’s market share in both domestic and export markets that determines the overall effect of 
restructuring reform on national welfare. Therefore, if Gazprom’s market power in Europe falls 
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because of growth in LNG trade, the simultaneous increase in supply from independent producers 
might still make Gazprom’s restructuring unprofitable. 
 
Figure 2 plots the dependence of national welfare on Gazprom’s export market share for two different 
scenarios: lower and higher Gazprom market shares in the domestic gas market. Both scenarios reflect 
current trends in the development of the Russian gas market. 
 
The first scenario is where Gazprom’s domestic share is increased. In this scenario, Gazprom offsets 
declining own production by acquiring gas assets from independent producers Novatek and Itera. 
Indeed, in recent years, Gazprom gradually started to acquire control over the independent producers’ 
gas production assets. In 2006, Gazprom bought 20% of Novatek and acquired control over Itera’s 
main producing fields. 
 
On the other hand, in the second scenario, Gazprom’s domestic share is reduced. This scenario reflects 
the ambitions of oil companies to increase their gas production. Both Rosneft and Lukoil stated on 
several occasions that they have potential to increase their gas production if they receive full access to 
transportation networks. 
 
Figure 2:Change in national welfare for different domestic Scenarios
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Obviously Gazprom’s market shares increase if independent producers are acquired by Gazprom. 
Then the split-up of the enlarged Gazprom will generate additional gains in the Russian domestic 
market. In this case, Gazprom has to control a larger share of the European market in order to justify 
its dominance in both markets. A smaller share for Gazprom in the domestic market has the opposite 
effect on the change in national welfare. The gains from Gazprom’s split-up will be lower, and Europe 
has to attract more gas from other suppliers if they want Gazprom to be split up. 
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Figure 2 illustrates that Gazprom has to allow competition in the domestic market if it wants to defend 
the efficiency of its current structure. The greater the competition Gazprom faces in the export market, 
the more important for Gazprom is the presence of independent producers in the Russian market. If the 
impact of reform on national welfare is a criterion that determines whether Gazprom will maintain its 
integrity in the future, Gazprom’s efforts to prevent export from independent producers can be 
explained. Indeed, the opening of gas export markets for other Russian gas suppliers will withdraw 
some of the non-Gazprom supply from the domestic market to export markets. As a result, Gazprom’s 
domestic market share increases while the market share in Europe decreases. Both these changes will 
contribute to larger gains if Gazprom is split up, and will make Gazprom’s reform more attractive. 
5.2 Gazprom’s market share in Russia 
Figure 3 below illustrates the dependence of changes in Russian national welfare on Gazprom’s 
domestic market share. Several runs of the numerical model, where production capacities for Russian 
independent gas producers differ in each run, simulate changes in Gazprom’s market share in Russia. 
Figure 3 assumes continuity of the scenarios for different production capacities of Russian 
independent gas suppliers. 
 
Figure3: Welfare effect of Gazprom's split up for different Gazprom's market share in Russia
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Change in national welfare generated by Gazprom’s restructuring is growing as production by 
independent producers decreases, and therefore Gazprom’s domestic market share grows. However, 
according to simulations in Figure 4, Gazprom has to control at least 28% of the domestic market in 
order for the split-up reform to be welfare enhancing. The negative effect of reform on Russian export 
profit reflects the fact that national welfare decreases for a low market share for Gazprom in the 
domestic market. For a higher market share in the domestic market, the reform will generate increases 
in Russian national welfare. 
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Figure 3 depicts the effect on Russian national welfare of Gazprom’s split-up, and changes in 
Gazprom’s market share in the Russian market given the European market structure in the base year 
2005. The rapid development of LNG technology and annual growth of gas supply from new exporters 
is evidence that the structure of the European gas market is changing. In Figure 4, I add  plots for two 
scenarios.  In the first scenario, Gazprom’s market share in Europe is reduced. This scenario reflects 
expected growth of LNG in Europe and assumes the immediate entrance of several new gas exporters 
such as Qatar, Iran, Egypt and Libya. The merger of two Norwegian gas exporters, NorskHydro and 
Statoil, in October 2007, reflects the second scenario. The merger of Norwegian petroleum companies 
might increase Gazprom’s market share in Europe. 
 
Figure 4: Change in national welfare for different European scenarios
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The entrance of LNG suppliers into Europe will increase the Russian gains from Gazprom’s 
restructuring. If all LNG projects that are currently proposed are able to commence production, the 
attractiveness of Gazprom’s restructuring is virtually unquestionable. Only if Gazprom controls less 
than 17% of the domestic market might the Russian economy face a decrease in national welfare, but 
the decrease is rather insignificant. 
 
As Figure 4 shows, the impact of a merger between Statoil and NorskHydro on Russian national 
welfare is small. The low share, 12%, of Norwegian gas in the European gas market means that the 
merger does not significantly affect the European gas market. Nevertheless, the merger of Norwegian 
gas producers gives Gazprom additional arguments for defending a restructure, because the merger 
will decrease the national welfare. 
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5.3 Alternative split-up of Gazprom 
A split-up of Gazprom into subsidiaries was the reform option that received the most attention when 
gas restructuring reform was discussed in early 2000s. Nevertheless, if Gazprom’s restructuring ever 
happens, the division into subsidiaries is not the only straightforward way to restructure Gazprom. 
Table 4 shows that the split-up of Gazprom into two companies instead of six will actually increase 
Russian welfare. Alternatively, if property rights for each Russian gas field belong to different private 
firms, national welfare will be even lower compared with a split-up into subsidiaries. 
 
Table 4: Effects of the Gazprom’s restructuring for different split-up alternatives 
 Gazprom is 
split up by 
subsidiaries 
Gazprom is 
split up into 
two companies 
Gazprom is 
split up by 
fields 
Price in Europe on natural gas ($/1000 m3) 149 169 145 
 Total supply to European market (bcm) 824 734 846 
which is divided between:    
 Gazprom   404    (49%)*  308    (42%)  448    (53%) 
non-Russian producers  420    (51%)  426    (58%)  398    (47%) 
Price in Russia on natural gas ($/1000 m3) 80 104 75 
Total supply to Russian market (bcm) 297 268 306 
which is divided between:    
 Gazprom 148.5    (50%)   94     (35%)  178    (58%) 
non-Russian producers  148.5    (50%)  174    (65%)  128    (42%) 
Export profit change (in $ billion) –2.73 –0.41 –3.36 
Domestic welfare change ($ billion) 1.56 1.19 1.46 
National welfare change ( in $ billion) –1.17 0.78 –1.90 
Note:* In parenthesis markets shares are reported. 
 
Table 4 shows that when Gazprom is split up into two companies instead of six, domestic gains from 
the restructuring reform are higher than reductions in export profit, and the overall effect of such a 
split-up is positive. A split-up of such a giant company as Gazprom into two independent companies 
means that each new company will still retain substantial market power in supply markets. The fall in 
price in both markets is not as large as if Gazprom were divided into subsidiaries, and therefore 
reductions in export profit are quite moderate. On the contrary, more drastic restructuring reform that 
splits Gazprom on the field base implies a strong fall in export prices and therefore larger reductions in 
Russian gas export profit. As a result, Gazprom’s split-up on the field base lowers Russian national 
welfare more than if Gazprom were split up into subsidiaries. 
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Figure 5: Different restructuring scenarios
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Both Table 4 and Figure 5 illustrate that the scope of the reform is important. In Figure 5, the changes 
in national welfare for three different reforms are plotted against Gazprom’s market shares in Europe. 
Figure 5 shows that if Gazprom’s market share in Europe is low, then a reform that splits up Gazprom 
into several companies generates more gains than a reform where Gazprom is divided into only two 
companies. However, when Gazprom’s market share in Europe is large, moderate reform might 
generate larger gains. If restructuring brings decreases in national welfare, these decreases will be 
smaller than under strong reform. 
6. Results’ Sensitivity to Demand Price Elasticities 
It is important to stress that conclusions about the negative effect of Gazprom’s restructuring on 
Russian national welfare is based on the parameters chosen for the numerical model. The price 
elasticities of natural gas demand in Europe and in Russia are chosen to be –0.7 and –0.4 respectively. 
However, the uncertainty about the exact value of the elasticities can undermine the quantitative 
conclusions of the numerical model. Although calculation of the sensitivity of the results to different 
elasticities does not remove uncertainty, it can indicate how numerical results are dependent on the 
elasticity parameters. 
 
Figure 6 shows how a split-up of Gazprom affects Russian national welfare when the elasticity 
parameters vary within the range –0.3 to –2 for the base scenario. The solid line in Figure 6 illustrates 
how Russian national welfare depends on the European price elasticity of demand. The dotted line in 
Figure 6 illustrates how Russian national welfare depends on the Russian price elasticity of demand. 
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Figure 6: Changes in national welfare for different values of the elasticity 
parameters
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According to Figure 6, increases in the European price elasticity affect Russian national welfare 
positively, while increases in the Russian price elasticity affect Russian national welfare negatively. A 
split-up of Gazprom results in increased supply to both European and Russian markets. However, the 
more elastic a market, the smaller the price fall because of a supply increase in the market. The higher 
the elasticity of European demand, the lower the Russian export reductions. Therefore, the overall 
effect of the restructuring reform on national welfare might be positive given a more elastic European 
gas market. However, for a more elastic Russian domestic market, restructuring reform generates less 
growth in consumer surplus because the price fall is moderate in response to a supply increase. Then 
the more elastic the Russian gas market, the more negative the overall effect of the restructuring 
reform on national welfare. 
 
Although the quantitative conclusion about the effect of Gazprom’s restructuring on national welfare 
is primarily determined by elasticity parameters, under- or overestimating the elasticities in both 
markets will not necessarily change the qualitative conclusion about the unattractiveness of the 
Gazprom restructuring. 
7. Conclusion 
The aim of this paper is to explore the conditions that will support Gazprom’s restructuring reform, as 
well as to study how splitting up Gazprom into several companies might affect the Russian and 
European gas markets. The paper argues analytically and by using numerical simulation that although 
the splitting up of Gazprom’s production will benefit European and Russian consumers, such reform 
will not necessarily increase Russian national welfare. Gazprom’s position in the European market and 
the trade-off between consumer’s surplus and producer’s profit influences the attractiveness of the 
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reform. In the absence of exports, the removal of Gazprom’s dominant position in the Russian 
deregulated gas market would be beneficial for Russia. In the current situation, when Russia is the 
largest supplier of natural gas to the European market, the reductions in Russian export profit might 
outweigh the positive effects of reform in the domestic market. 
 
Comparing different scenarios, the paper suggests that the market shares that Gazprom has in both the 
Russian domestic and European markets are important factors that determine whether Gazprom’s 
restructuring will be beneficial for Russia. The small market share of Gazprom in Europe and the large 
market share of Gazprom in the domestic market is a combination that plausibly results in Russian 
national welfare increasing because of the restructuring of Gazprom. 
 
The results of the paper have several important implications. First, for Gazprom, which opposes its 
restructuring reform, the presence of independent gas producers is important, especially if the 
development of the LNG market puts pressure on Gazprom in Europe. Second, increased competition 
from non-Russian gas suppliers in Europe might affect the restructuring of Gazprom and competition 
in the Russian gas market. Third, if Gazprom continues its acquisition of the gas assets of independent 
producers, which is occurring now in the Russian gas industry, then more aggressive behavior by 
Gazprom in the European gas market can be expected. Finally, the size of Gazprom’s restructuring 
reform is an important factor that determines the attractiveness of the reform under the national 
welfare criteria. 
 
It is important to stress that the results in this paper are based on a number of assumptions, especially 
deregulation of the Russian gas market and Cournot competition among producers in both the Russian 
and European gas markets. Therefore, this study cannot be used to predict future development of the 
supply side in the European gas market, which is characterized by long-term contracts, or the supply in 
the Russian gas market, which is characterized by strong government price regulation. 
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Appendix  
Proof of Proposition 1 
i) 
Rearranging (1) and (2) yields:  
(A1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2' ' SS NS S S NS S NS S NSYP Y Y Y P Y Y P Y Y P Y Ym+ + + = + + + . 
(A1) equalizes splitters’ marginal revenue before and after the split-up. 
 
Assume that Y1 S > Y2 S. 
 
According to the regularity condition P”Y S + P’ + P’ < 0, the prereform marginal revenue of splitters 
)()(' NSSSNSS YYPYYYP +++  decreases with Y S. It follows that the total marginal revenue of 
splitters decreases as Y S decreases.  
 
Then: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2' ' ' .SS NS S S NS S NS S S NS S NS S NSYP Y Y Y P Y Y P Y Y Y P Y Y P Y Y P Y Ym+ + + < + + + < + + +
 
The inequality above contradicts (A1). 
 
ii) 
A split-up increases the splitter’s output. From (5), output Y NS is unambiguously determined by output 
Y S. Therefore, in order to prove that Y1 NS ≥ Y2 NS and Y 2 ≥ Y1, it is enough to show that  
 1 0
NS
S
Y
Y
∂− < <∂ . 
Differentiating (2) with respect to YS yields: 
(A2) 
1
NS
S
Y n
Y n
∂ = −∂ + . 
Therefore, 1 0
NS
S
Y
Y
∂− < <∂  and the aggregate output of nonsplitters decreases when the output of 
splitters increases. However, the decrease in nonsplitters’ output is smaller than the increase in 
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splitters’ production. Differentiating aggregate industry output Y = Y S + Y NS(Y S) with respect to SY , 
it easily follows that 0 1S
Y
Y
∂< <∂ . 
(A3) 1
1S
Y
Y n
∂ =∂ +  
 
iii) 
Differentiating (1) and (2) with respect to n yields: 
(A4) 1 1 0
(2 )
S NSY Y
n n n
∂ = − <∂ + , 
(A5) 1 12 0
(2 )
NS NSY Y
n n n
∂ = >∂ + . 
iv) 
Differentiating (4) and (5) with respect to m yields: 
(A6) 2 2 2 2 22
'''' ' '' ' 0
S S NS S SY Y Y Y P YPP P P P
m m m m m m
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+ + + + − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
, 
(A7) 2 2 2 2 ''' '' ' 0
S NS NS NSY Y Y Y PP P P P
m n m n n
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞∂ ∂+ + + + =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟∂ ∂⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
. 
Solving system (A6)–(A7), it is straightforward to determine that an increase in m will affect the 
postreform splitters’ output: 
 ( )2 2 22''1 '' '
S S SY Y P YPP P
m m m m
α⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂ − + + =⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ ⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
, 
where 0 1α< < , 
2
2
'' '
''' '
NS
NS
YP P
n
Y PP P
n n
α
+
≡
+ +
. 
 
According to the regularity condition, 2'' ' 0
SYP P
m
+ < , and therefore 2 0
SY
m
∂ >∂ . 
 
For the linear demand function ( )( ) S NSP Y a b Y Y= − + , we have: 
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 2 2 ( 1) 0
(1 )
S SY Y n
m m n m
∂ += >∂ + + . 
 
Proof of Proposition 2 
Let ( )( )1 1 1 1 1S S NS S S Sa b Y Y Y C Yπ = − + −  and ( )( )2 2 2 2 2NS S NS S S Sa b Y Y Y C Yπ = − + −  be the joint profit of 
splitters before and after the reform respectively. Then the split-up increases splitters’ profit if 
2 1 0
S Sπ π− > . 
 
Rearranging (1) yields: 
(A8) 1 12
S S NSa C bY bY− = + . 
Given (A8), the splitters’ prereform profit S1π  can be further calculated as: 
(A9) ( )21 1S Sb Yπ = . 
It is easy to show that the postreform supply of splitters, 2
SY , and nonsplitters, 2
NSY , and consequently 
splitters’ postreform profit 2
NSπ , can be directly calculated from the prereform supplies Y1S and Y1NS. 
However, before doing so, I want to stress that all supplies in the model have to be nonnegative. 
According to Proposition 1, after the split-up, supplies between splitters and nonsplitters are relocated: 
the splitters’ supply increases and the nonsplitters’ decreases. Then if cost differences imply that 
prereform supply of the nonsplitters is much lower than of the splitters, the split-up might result in the 
crowding out of the nonsplitters from the market; that is, postreform nonsplitters’ supply is zero, 
2 0
NSY = . 
 
Combining (1) and (4), which set conditions for the aggregate supply of splitters before and after the 
split-up respectively, yields: 
(A10) ( ) ( )21 1 1 2 2SS S NS S NSYbY b Y Y b b Y Ym− − + = − − + . 
Combining (2) and (5), which set conditions for aggregate supply of nonsplitters before and after the 
split-up respectively, yields: 
(A11) ( ) ( )1 21 1 2 2NS NSS NS S NSY Yb b Y Y b b Y Yn n− − + = − − + . 
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Then from (A10) and (A11), it is possible to express postreform supplies using prereform supplies: 
(A12) 12 1
( 1)
1
S
NS NS Y m nY Y
m n
−= − + + ,  
(A13) 12
(2 )
1
S
S Y n mY
m n
+= + + . 
According to (A12), the output of nonsplitters after the reform will be negative if 11
( 1)
1
S
NS Y m nY
m n
−< + + . 
Because supply cannot be negative, 11
( 1)
1
S
NS Y m nY
m n
−≤ + +  means that nonsplitters produce nothing and 
leave the market after the reform. The inequality above can be equivalently expressed in the prereform 
market shares: 
(A14) 11
( 1)
1
S
NS S m nS
m n
−≤ + + , 
where 11
1
S
S YS
Y
≡  and 11
1
NS
NS YS
Y
≡  are the prereform market share of the splitters. 
 
Given that 1 11
NS SS S= − , rearranging (A14) gives a condition under which no nonsplitters are left in 
the market after the reform: 
 1
1
1
S m nS
m mn
+ +≥ + + . 
Furthermore, calculating profit 2
Sπ , I will distinguish between two cases: the first case, when 2NSY   is 
positive and the second case, when 2 0
NSY = . I will calculate the splitters’ profit difference 2 1S Sπ π− for 
each case. 
 
Case 1: 2 0
NSY >  (or equivalently 1 11
S m nS
m mn
+ +< + + ). 
In this case, 2
NSY  is defined by (A12), and 2
SY   is defined by (A13). Substituting (A8), (A12) and 
(A13) into the expression ( )( )2 2 2 2 2S S NS S S Sa b Y Y Y C Yπ = − + − , it follows that: 
(A15) 
2
1
2
(2 )
1
S
S Y nbm
m n
π ⎛ ⎞+= ⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ . 
From (A15) and (A9), it is easy to calculate the difference between 2
Sπ  and 1Sπ : 
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 ( ) 222 1 1 2(2 ) 1( 1)S S S m nb Y m nπ π ⎛ ⎞+− = −⎜ ⎟+ +⎝ ⎠ . 
The split-up will increase splitters’ profit if 
2
2
(2 ) 1
( 1)
m n
m n
+ >+ +  or equivalently if (2 ) 1m n m n+ > + + . 
Simplifying the last inequality, we obtain 1n m+ > . 
 
Then I can conclude that a split-up will increase the splitters’ profit if 1
1
1
S m nS
m mn
+ +< + +  and if 
1n m+ > . 
 
Case 2: 2 0
NSY =  (or equivalently 1 11
S m nS
m mn
+ +≥ + + ). 
Given that 2 0
NSY = , the splitters’ supply 2SY  can be calculated from (4) and (A8): 
(A16) 
( )1 1
2
2
1
S NS
S
m Y Y
Y
m
+= − . 
Substituting (A16) and (A8) into expression ( )2 2 2 2S S S S Sa bY Y C Yπ = − − , it follows that: 
(A17) 
( )21 1
2 2
2
( 1)
S NS
S
bm Y Y
m
π += + . 
From (A13) and (A9), it is easy to calculate the difference between S2π  and S1π : 
 ( )2 1 1 1 2 1S S NS SY m Y m mπ π− = − − + . 
The split-up will increase splitters’ profit if ( )1 1 2 1NS SY m Y m m> − + . Writing this inequality in 
terms of the splitters’ prereform market share yields: 
 1 1
S mS
m m
< − + . 
Then I can conclude that a split-up will increase the splitters’ profit if 1
1
1
S m nS
m mn
+ +≥ + +  and if 
 1 1
S mS
m m
< − + . 
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It can be shown that if 1n m+ = , then 1
1 1
m n m
m mn m m
+ + =+ + − + . Therefore, if 1n m+ > , then 
1
1 1
m n m
m mn m m
+ + <+ + − + , and if 1n m+ ≤ , then 
1
1 1
m n m
m mn m m
+ + ≥+ + − + . 
 
Summing up the conclusions from both cases, it follows that: 
i) if 1n m+ >  and 1 1
S mS
m m
< − + , then the split-up will increase splitters profit; 
ii) if 1n m+ >  and 1 1
S mS
m m
< − + , then the split-up will increase splitters profit; and 
iii) if 1n m+ ≤ , then the split-up will not increase splitters’ profit. 
 
Proof of Proposition 3 
In a closed economy, welfare W consists of consumer surplus CS, profit of splitters and profit of 
nonsplitters. 
 S NSW CS π π= + + , 
where 
0 0
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
Y Y
CS P x dx P Y Y a bx dx a bY Y= − = − − −∫ ∫ . 
 
Thus, welfare can be written as: 
(A18) 
( )
0
( )
S NS SY Y Y
S S NS NSW a bx dx C Y C Y
+
= − − −∫ . 
Similarly to the proof of Proposition 2, I will distinguish here between two cases: Case 1, when 
nonsplitters remain in the market after the split-up, that is, 2 0
NSY >  and defined from (A12), and Case 
2, when nonsplitters leave the market after the split-up, that is, 2 0
NSY = . 
 
Case 1: Y2 NS > 0 (or equivalently 1
1
1 ++
++<
mnm
nmS S ). 
A direct way to find conditions under which a split-up is welfare increasing is to calculate the 
difference between postreform welfare W2 and prereform welfare W1. However, for the case with 
2 0
NSY > , direct calculation of the difference 2 1W W−  turned out to be very slow and cumbersome. It 
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turned out that a more elegant way is to write the change in welfare 2 1W W−  as an integral of small 
changes from 1
SY  to 2
SY : 
 
2
1
2 1
S
S
Y
S
S
Y
WW W dY
Y
∂− = ∂∫ . 
The change in welfare W because of an infinitesimally small split-up can be calculated as: 
(A19) 
( )
( ) 111 .( 1)
NS NS
S NS NS NS
S S S
NSNS NS
NS NS S S
S
W Y Ya bY a bY C C C C
Y Y Y
YY Ya bY C C C b b Y
Y n n n
∂ ∂ ∂= − + − − − + −∂ ∂ ∂
⎛ ⎞⎛ ⎞∂= − − + + − = + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠
 
The third equality in (A19) is because of (1), (2) and (A2). 
 
(A19) indicates that if splitters are more efficient than nonsplitters, that is, S NSC C<  or equivalently 
1
1
NS
S YY
n
> , then the split-up will increase welfare. The inequality 11
NS
S YY
n
>  can be rewritten as: 
1
1
1
SS
n
> + . 
 
The welfare change 2 1W W−  is an integral sum of SWY
∂
∂  for all Y 
S from Y1 S to Y2 S. Nonsplitters 
decrease output as splitters’ output increases. Thus, in 2 1W W− , each next component is smaller than 
the previous one. Then, if the first component in 2 1W W−  is negative, the whole integral sum is 
negative. The first component in 2 1W W−  is: 
 
1
1
1 1S S
NS
S
S Y Y
YW b Y
Y n=
⎛ ⎞∂ = −⎜ ⎟∂ +⎝ ⎠
. 
If 11 1
NS
S YY
n
< + , then the first component is negative. The inequality 
1
1 1
NS
S YY
n
< +  can be rewritten as 
1
1
2
SS
n
< + . Therefore, if 1
1
2
SS
n
< + , then the first component in 2 1W W−  is negative and the entire 
change in welfare because of the split-up will be negative. 
 
According to Proposition 1(iv), the greater the number of newly established firms m, the larger a 
splitter’s output expansion. Then, the larger is m, greater the number of components of which the 
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integral sum 2 1W W−  consists. Therefore, for 1 1 1
SS
n
> + , the increase in welfare generated by a split-
up increases with m. On the contrary, for 1
1
2
SS
n
< + , the decrease in welfare generated by a split-up 
increases with m. 
 
Case 2: Y2 NS = 0 (or equivalently 1
1
1 ++
++≥
mnm
nmS S ). 
In this case, I directly calculate W1, W2 and the difference 2 1W W− . 
(A20)    
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
1 1 1
2( )
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1 1
0
2
1 1
1 1
2
1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
2
2
12 .
2
S NS S S NSY Y Y
S S NS NS S NS S S NS NS
S NS
S S NS NS
S NS
S NS S S NS NS
Y Y
W a bx dx C Y C Y a Y Y b C Y C Y
Y Y
a C Y a C Y b
Y Ynb Y Y Y b Y Y Y b
n
+ += − − − = + − − −
+= − + − −
+⎛ ⎞+⎛ ⎞= + + + −⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠
∫
 
The fourth equation in (A20) is derived from (1) and (2). 
 
Calculation of W2 is similar to calculation of W1, with the only difference being that 2 0
NSY = : 
(A21) ( ) ( )
2
2
2 1 1 22 2
S
S NS S
Y
W b Y Y Y b= + − . 
Substituting (A16) into (A21) and simplifying, I can further express postreform welfare W2 in terms of 
prereform supplies: 
(A22) 
( )( )
( )
2
1 1
2 2
2 2
2 1
S NSbm m Y Y
W
m
+ += + . 
From (A22) and (A20), it is straightforward to calculate the difference between 2W  and 1W : 
(A23) ( ) ( ) ( )2 22 1 1 1 1 13 24 4 12 2S S NS S nW W Y Y Y Y nβ β β +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− = − + − + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ , 
where 2
( 2)
2( 1)
m m
m
β += + . 
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Dividing (A23) by 1 1
S NSY Y+  and rewriting in terms of the splitters’ prereform market share yields: 
(A24) ( )22 1 1 1
1 1
1 2 22
2
S S
S NS
W W n nS S
Y Y n n n
β β β− + +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞= − + + + −⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
A split-up will increase welfare if the right-hand side of (A24) is positive. It easy to calculate that 
1 0,n
n
β +− <  22 0
n
β + >  and 2 0
2
n
n
β +− < . Then the right-hand side of (A24) is a quadratic function 
that resembles ∩  and is positive for all 1SS , satisfying 1 1 2Sx S x< < , while 1x  and 2x  are roots of the 
quadratic equation: 
(A25) 2 1 2 22 0
2
n nx x
n n n
β β β+ +⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞− + + + − =⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠ . 
Market share SS1 cannot exceed one, that is, 1 1.
SS ≤  On the other hand, this case concerns only the 
splitters’ market shares that satisfy 1
1
1
Sm n S
m mn
+ + ≤+ + . Then if I can show that 1
1
1
m nx
m mn
+ +< + +  and 
2 1x > , then it is straightforward to conclude that a split-up will increase the splitters’ profit for all 
1
1 1Sm n S
m n mn
+ + ≤ ≤+ + . 
 
In (A25), set 1x = , then the left-hand side of (A25) is calculated as 
2
2
3 2 34 0
2 2( 1)
m m
m
β + −− = ≥+ . This 
allows the conclusion that 2 1x > . Similarly, setting 11
m nx
m mn
+ += + +  in (A25), after some algebra, it is 
possible to calculate that the left-hand side of (A25) is positive. This allows the conclusion that 
1
1
1
m nx
m mn
+ +< + + . 
 
Therefore, it follows that for all 1
1 1Sm n S
m n mn
+ + ≤ ≤+ + , a split-up will increase the splitters’ profit. 
 
 
